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Abstract 
This paper employs the method of Aronson et al. (1994) to decompose the redistributive 
effect of the Dutch health care financing system into three components: a progressivity 
component, a classical horizontal equity component and a reranking component. Results are 
presented for the health care financing system as a whole, as well as for its constituent 
parts. A final section sets out to uncover the relative importance (in terms of their effects on 
progressivity, horizontal equity and reranking) of the key institutional features of one 
component of the Dutch system - the AWBZ social insurance scheme. © 1997 Elsevier 
Science B.V. 
JEL classification: D31 ; D63; H23; H51 ; I 10 
Keywords: Health care finance; Progressivity; Horizontal equity: Income redistribution 
I. Introduction 
The OECD (1992) has suggested that amongst he policy objectives hared by a 
number of its members is the goal of income protection. This, it suggests, involves 
protecting patients from payments for health care which threaten income suffi- 
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1 ciency, and relating payment for such protection to individuals' ability to pay. 
Recent events suggest a continuing support amongst policy-makers for this 
objective. In the late 1980s, the British government decided not to abandon the 
tax-financing of the National Health Service (NHS) on the grounds that it was felt 
to be fair that under the NHS the better-off pay more for their health care than the 
worse-off. The US government, by contrast, in the mid-1990s did attempt o 
reform the American health care financing system partly because it was felt to be 
both horizontally inequitable (because of gaps in cover and the emphasis on 
out-of-pocket payments) and vertically inequitable (people on fairly low incomes 
paying large proportions of their income in health insurance premiums). The 
Dutch health care reform package, proposed by Dekker in the late 1980s and never 
fully implemented, was motivated in part by a desire to reduce the horizontal 
inequities between the privately insured and the publicly insured. The recent 
reforms in Germany, aimed at increasing the degree of choice of sickness fund and 
trying to ensure open enrolment, were motivated partly by a desire to reduce the 
differences in contribution rates across sickness funds. 2 Concerns over the 
horizontal and vertical inequities in health care finance are apparent in other 
countries too. 
Protection against out-of-pocket payments can be provided via taxation, social 
insurance and private insurance. However, the degree to which each links pay- 
ments for protection to ability-to-pay is likely to vary. Risk-rated private insur- 
ance, for example, is unlikely to score highly on this criterion: it is likely that 
those who are least able to pay will end up being charged the highest premiums 
(vertical inequity), since the age-adjusted probability of requiring health care is 
likely to vary inversely with income; furthermore, premiums are likely to vary 
amongst persons on a given income (horizontal inequity), since although income 
and premiums will be correlated, the correlation will be imperfect, and hence a 
host of factors such as pre-existing conditions, lifestyle, etc. are likely to be used 
as risk indicators. Tax finance and social insurance are likely to link payment for 
protection against out-of-pocket payments more closely to ability-to-pay. Under 
social insurance, contributions are linked not to risk factors but to earnings. Insofar 
as earnings are correlated with income (which is likely to be the better measure of 
ability-to-pay), the better-off will make larger contributions, thereby contributing 
towards vertical equity, and insofar as contributions are linked solely to earnings, 
the variation in social insurance contributions at a given income level is likely to 
be relatively small, thereby contributing towards horizontal equity. Under tax 
finance, payments for health care are linked to whatever tax bases are used. 
It is interesting, though not our purpose here, to speculate why these principles eem to command 
such widespread support. See Culyer (1993) for some thoughts on the issue. 
2 Von der Schulenburg (1994) notes that the rates ranged from 10.8% to 16.4% of payroll in the 
early 1990s. 
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Whether tax finance links payments for protection more closely to ability-to-pay 
than social insurance depends on the details of the two schemes. Income tax has 
the advantage over social insurance that it is levied on income rather than 
earnings. From a horizontal equity perspective, it has the advantage of being one 
scheme applying to everyone. Social insurance, by contrast, often involves several 
schemes with different contribution schedules. But, of course, income tax has its 
own horizontal inequities (mortgage interest ax relief, for example) and in any 
case tax finance relies not just on income tax but also on other taxes, many of 
which will be only marginally linked to ability-to-pay, if at all. 
Our concern in this paper is to explore empirically the impact of health care 
financing on the distribution of income, in the hope that our analysis may shed 
light on the question of how well different forms of finance perform in terms of 
the income protection objective. As the seminal paper by Aronson et al. (1994) 
(hereafter AJL) on the redistributive ffect of income tax makes clear, the 
redistributive ffect of a particular health care financing system will depend not 
only on its progressivity, but also on the extent of any horizontal inequity 
associated with the system and on the extent of any reranking resulting from it. 
The first of these issues has received a good deal of attention recently in the 
literature on health care financing (cf. Hurst, 1985; Gottschalk et al., 1989; 
Wagstaff et al., 1989; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 1992; van Doorslaer et al., 
1993b). The second and third issues, by contrast, have received virtually no 
attention in this literature. 3
This is a serious omission. Depending on the extent of horizontal inequity and 
reranking involved in health care finance, a progressivity analysis can give a 
misleading impression about the income redistribution associated with the financ- 
ing system. For example, the introduction of differential treatment of households 
on similar equivalent incomes will tend to reduce the redistributive ffect of a 
progressive financing system. Conversely, introducing differential treatment into a 
regressive system will tend to increase its redistributive effect. Knowing only the 
progressivity characteristics of the financing system thus means that one has only 
a partial picture of the income redistribution associated with the financing system 
in question. 
Our purpose in this paper is to show how the AJL method can be applied to 
health care financing so as to allow the overall redistributive impact of a financing 
system - and its constituent parts - to be decomposed into progressivity, 
horizontal equity and reranking components. Section 2 contains a brief summary 
of their approach. Section 3 contains a brief description of the Dutch health care 
financing system - the system to which we apply their methods. Section 4 outlines 
3 A couple of reports (in Dutch) describe the horizontal inequities in Dutch health care financing but 
do not seek to measure them. For an early attempt o measure horizontal inequity in the Dutch and 
Italian health care financing systems, see Wagstaff et al. (1990). 
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our data and variable definitions, and describes the computational methods used. 
Our principal results are reported in section 5. Section 6 contains some micro- 
simulation detective work. In it we try to identify the relative importance of the 
various sources of differential treatment in the AWBZ component of the Dutch 
health care financing system (the social insurance component providing cover for 
"catastrophic" medical expenses). We conclude that most of the redistributive 
effect associated with the differential treatment involved in the AWBZ scheme is 
attributable to the exemption of pensioners. 
2. Decomposing redistributive effect: the AJL method 
The redistributive impact associated with a tax can be measured by the 
reduction in the Gini coefficient caused by the tax. Thus: 
RE - G x - G x_  r ( 1 ) 
where G x and G x_  r are the pre-tax and post-tax Gini coefficients respectively. In
a world where everyone faces the same tax schedule, irrespective of their 
non-income characteristics (e.g. whether or not they are married, whether or not 
they own a home, etc.), we have 
RE= K T (2) 
where g is the share of income taken in tax and K T is Kakwani's (Kakwani, 
1977) index of tax progressivity. 
Suppose now that people do not face the same tax schedule and that the tax 
liability of household h is equal to 
T h= T(x )  + eh(x)  (3) 
where T(x) is the common amount of tax paid by all households with income x 
and eh(x) is household h's deviation from this amount. It is assumed that these 
deviations average to zero across all households - as AJL put it, "on average, at 
each x, the tax system gets it right". The presence of ~ h(x) in Eq. (3) means that 
households with the same income x can end up paying different amounts of tax. 
This is the classical notion of hor i zonta l  inequity,  Only if eh(x) is zero for all h 
and x, is the tax system horizontally equitable. Furthermore, the presence of 
e h(x )  in Eq. (3) may result in households moving up or down the income 
distribution after they have paid their taxes. There may, in other words, be 
re rank ing  as one moves from the pre-tax income distribution to the post-tax 
distribution. 
These two possibilities are illustrated in Fig. 1, which shows the relationship 
between post-tax income, x-  T h, and pre-tax income, x, for a progressive tax. 
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Fig. 1. Horizontal inequity and reranking. 
The " fans"  show the effect of differential tax treatment - for example, house- 
holds starting off with pre-tax income x 3 will, on average, end up paying 
x 3 -T (x  3) in tax, but there will be variation about this amount reflecting the 
presence of eh(X) in Eq. (3). The existence of fans thus indicates the presence of 
horizontal inequity. If the fans overlap (as they do in the case of households 
starting out with pre-tax incomes of x~ and x2), then reranking occurs - the 
shaded region of the fans indicate that the household that was richer before tax has 
become the poorer after tax. 
The presence of differential tax treatment means that Eq. (2) is no longer valid. 
AJL show 4 that it can be replaced by 
RE= ~ K r -~axGF¢~, - [G  x_ r -Cx_T]  (4) 
where Kr is the Kakwani index computed on the assumption that everyone faces 
the same tax schedule, a x is the product of the population share squared and the 
post-tax income share of households with income x, GF(x) is the Gini coefficient 
for post-tax income for households with pre-tax income x and Cx r is the 
4 Cf. also Lambert and Aronson (t993) (p. 1223). As Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995) make clear, there 
is an index number problem in decompositions such as Eq. (4). Implicitly, K r weights the income 
changes in the move from the pre-tax to the post-tax distributions by the pre-tax rankings. An 
alternative way of measuring progressivity, developed by Lerman and Yitzhaki, would involve 
weighting the income changes by the post-tax rankings. Using this approach would give rise to a 
different (though similar) decomposition from that in Eq. (4). Which is preferable is unclear. It might 
be argued, on the one hand, that the pre-tax ranking (and hence the AJL decomposition) is
inappropriate since one of the functions of the tax in question might be to generate a more equitable 
ranking of taxpayers than that arising before taxes. But, on the other hand, weighting by the post-tax 
ranking is open to the objection that one then simply assumes that the post-tax ranking is actually the 
one that was intended to emerge. 
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post-tax concentration i dex obtained by ranking households first according to 
their pre-tax income and then within each group of pre-tax equals by their post-tax 
income. The first term, which AJL call V, measures the inequality reduction that 
would have obtained if there had been no differential tax treatment. The second 
term, which AJL call H, measures the extent of classical horizontal inequity - i.e., 
the unequal treatment of equals - by taking a weighted sum of the Gini 
coefficients GF~x~ of the fans. These Gini coefficients are zero only if the Eh(x) 
are zero for all x and h. The third term, which AJL call R, measures the extent of 
reranking in the move from the pre-tax distribution to the post-tax distribution by 
comparing the post-tax Gini coefficient with the post-tax concentration 
coefficient. 5 If there is no reranking, R is zero. 
The decomposition i Eq. (4) helps - at least on the face of it - to clarify the 
distinction between horizontal inequity and reranking. This distinction has become 
blurred over the years as a result of several researchers insisting that the former 
can usefully be equated to the latter. 6 As AJL emphasise, however, horizontal 
inequity refers to the (unequal) treatment of equals, whilst reranking refers to the 
treatment of unequals. As Fig. 1 makes clear, horizontal inequity (the existence of 
fans) does not necessarily give rise to reranking (the existence of fan overlap). 
Furthermore, if reranking is to be deemed inequitable, then it must be on the basis 
of vertical equity considerations not horizontal equity considerations. 7A measure  
of horizontal inequity that is based on reranking is not a measure of horizontal 
equity in the classical sense of the term. Evidently H in Eq. (4) is. 8 This much is 
.s This is similar to the measure of reranking proposed by Atkinson (1980) and Plotnick (1981). 
6 Advocates of this view include Atkinson (1980), Plotnick (t981, 1982) and King (1983). Feldstein 
(1976) is also often considered as an advocate of this view - but see Lambert and Yitzhaki (1995). 
7 It may, of course, be the case, that some rerankings are considered (vertically) equitable. To 
assume that any reranking must be inequitable is to accept hat the initial ranking is fair. As Le Grand 
(1987) points out, this may not be the case. As he puts it: "surely the aim of most of the tax-transfer 
policies whose horizontal inequity is being assessed ... is precisely to correct some at least of the 
inequities in the original income distribution? In that case, it is perfectly possible that some rank 
reversals may be equitable; and in which case the extent o which rank reversals occur may be an 
indication of the policy's success in equity terms rather than an indication of its failure" (p. 433). Cf. 
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995) on this point. Of course, if one accepts that some reranking may be 
(vertically) equitable, one would presumably not regard as equitable the equal treatment of persons 
with the same pre-tax income. 
8 There are other indices of horizontal equity available which are not based on the notion of 
reranking. The measure proposed by Berliant and Strauss (1983, 1985) counts the number of instances 
where households in the same income class face different ax rates. This is not dissimilar to the 
approach suggested by Aronson et al. Kapiow's (Kaplow, 1989) measure is based on the changes in 
distances eparating households betbre and after a reform. A reform is regarded as horizontally 
equitable if the distance (in terms of income) separating all pairs of households remains unchanged 
after the reform. This is clearly directed at the issue of vertical equity rather than horizontal equity. The 
same is true of Slesnick's (Slesnick, 1989) measure in which a reform is c[assed as being horizontally 
equitable if all households experience the same change in utility. This is, of course, JS Mill's "equal 
absolute sacrifice" rule of vertical equity (cf. Musgrave and Musgrave, 1984, p. 240). 
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clear. Things get less clear when one considers the possible sources of reranking. 
In Fig. 1 the only possible source of reranking is the existence of  differential 
treatment - i.e. the fans. Thus an occurrence which offends the principle of 
vertical equity - if it offends any equity principle - can arise solely through the 
existence of hor&ontal inequity. As AJL point out, there is, however, another 
possible source of reranking - a marginal tax rate in excess of 100%. 9 This could 
cause reranking even if everyone faces the same tax schedule. 
The decomposition of RE in Eq. (4) can be rewritten in another way which aids 
diagrammatic nterpretation, amely: 
RE=[G x -Go] -  ~GF(~, - [G  x_ r -C  x r] (4') 
where G 0 is the post-tax Gini coefficient hat would have obtained if everyone 
with pre-tax income x had paid the same tax. The decomposition of RE is shown 
diagrammatically in Fig. 2. ~0 The pre-tax Lorenz curve is shown as L x. The 
curve labelled L 0 is the post-tax Lorenz curve that would have been observed in 
the absence of unequal tax treatment. The first term on the RHS of Eq. (4') - i.e. 
V - thus corresponds to the move from L x to L 0. It shows what the redistributive 
effect would have been in the absence of differential tax treatment. If such 
differential treatment occurs, L o is not the Lorenz curve where one ends up - the 
effect of differential tax treatment is to reduce the redistributive impact of the tax 
and hence push downwards the post-tax Lorenz curve. This reduction in redistribu- 
cumulative % of 
income & taxes 
Lo 
Lx 
cumulative % of population ranked by income 
Fig. 2. Redistributive effect and configuration of Lorenz and concentration curves. 
9 This would give rise to a downward-sloping section of the relationship between x and x -  T(x) 
and may result in a household to the left of the peak swapping places with a household to the right of 
the peak in the move from the pre-tax distribution to the post-tax distribution. 
10 Cf. also Lambert and Aronson (1993) (p. 1223). 
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tive effect can be broken down into two stages. The first entails the creation of 
inequality in post-tax incomes amongst groups of pre-tax equals (i.e., horizontal 
inequity) and corresponds to the second term on the RHS of Eq. (4') - i.e., H. 
Diagrammatically it corresponds to the move from L 0 to C x_  T, the latter being 
the concentration curve for post-tax income where households have been ranked 
first according to their pre-tax income and then within each group of pre-tax 
equals by their post-tax income. The second stage entails households moving up or 
down the income distribution as one moves from the pre-tax distribution to the 
post-tax distribution (i.e., reranking) and corresponds to the third term in Eq. (4') 
- i .e.R.  Diagrammatically it corresponds to the move from C x r to L x_  T" Note 
that L x_  r can never lie above C x_ T, which in turn can never lie above L 0. Thus 
H and R are always non-negative. 
Fig. 2 shows the case of a progressive tax. In the case of a regressive tax - i.e., 
one that involves pro-r ich redistribution and therefore negative values of RE and 
K T - the ordering of the various curves is different. Specifically, whilst it is still 
the case that L x_ r lies on or below C x_  T, which in turn lies on or below L o, L x 
now lies above  L o. Thus in this case, differential tax treatment increases  the 
redistributive effect of the tax. 
3. The Dutch health care financing system 
In what follows, we apply the AJL method to an analysis of the Dutch health 
care financing system. Like most health care financing systems, the Dutch system 
draws revenues from four sources: taxation, social insurance contributions, private 
insurance premiums and out-of-pocket payments. The relative shares of these 
sources are indicated in the row headed "Share"  in Table 1. These shares have 
been derived using a somewhat broader definition of "health care" than that used 
in van Doorslaer et al. (1993a) and includes care of the elderly, home help, and so 
on. This adds a further Dr  9 billion onto the Dfl 34.5 billion allocated in van 
Doorslaer et al. (1993a) and raises the shares financed via tax revenues (7% to 
14%) and out-of-pocket payments (7% to 11%). 
Even with the broader definition, taxation still accounts for only a small part of 
overall revenues. By far the biggest component of the health care financing system 
is social insurance. There were, in fact, two social insurance schemes operating in 
the Netherlands in 1987. The first, known as the AWBZ scheme, provided cover 
to everyone for catastrophic and other exceptional medical expenses. Contributions 
were compulsory for everyone below pensionable age, being a fixed proportion of 
earnings up to a ceiling and paid by the employer in the case of employees. The 
second social insurance scheme, involving sickness funds, provides cover to 
enrolees for expenses associated with short-term medical care. Enrolment was 
compulsory for, and available only to, wage-earners with earnings below Dr  
49 150, contributions being proportional to earnings up to a ceiling and split 
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Table 1 
Decomposition of redistributive impact of Dutch health care financing system, 1987 
507 
Decile/lndex Gross Direct Indirect Sickness AWBZ Private Direct Total 
income taxes taxes funds insurance payments 
1 3.9% 1.3% 5.6% 5.8% 1.1% 3.4% 6.2% 4.1% 
2 5.2% 1.8% 6.5% 8.9% 3.9% 2.3% 5.4% 5.6% 
3 6.2% 3.2% 8,2% 9.8% 5.0% 4.6% 5.4% 6.8% 
4 7.2% 4.2% 8.0% 10.9% 7.6% 6.5% 5.8% 8.2% 
5 8.3% 5.8% 9.4% 10.9% 8.8% 8.5% 7.9% 9.2% 
6 9.4% 7.3% 10.0% 10.9% 10.8% 10.4% t0.9% 10.5~ 
7 10.6% 9.5% 11.0% 10.9% 12.0% 12.4% t2.3% 11.5% 
8 12.4% 11.9% t2.0% 10.6% 13.8% 14.8% 13.2% 12.5% 
9 14.3% 15.4% I3.8% I 1.8% 16.8% 15.8% 14.5% 14.3% 
10 22.3% 39.5% 15.4% 9.5% 20.2~ 21.3% 18.4% 17.4% 
Share 7% 4% 33% 24% 14% 11% 93% 
g 0.0100 0.0055 0.0500 0.0278 0.(/246 (I.0158 0.1337 
K r 0.23898 -0.10759 -0.22105 0.04670 0.05257 -0,03803 -0.05431 
RE 0.00241 -0.00060 -0.01288 0.00119 0,00089 -0.00099 -0.00971 
V 0.00242 -0.00060 -0.01164 0.00133 0.00133 -0.00081 -0.00838 
H 0.00000 0.00000 0.00029 0.00008 0.00019 0.0001 I (I.00[129 
R 0.00000 0.00000 0.00094 0.00007 0.(10045 0.00027 0.0[) 1(13 
equally between the employee and the employer. ~ Those insured with sickness 
funds comprise roughly 60% of the population. 
Those not insured with sickness funds in 1987 typically obtained cover for 
short-term edical expenses from a private insurer, the premiums for which were 
not income-related but were instead sometimes risk-related (for example, accord- 
ing to age). Persons with private insurance had the option of being covered only 
for certain types of care and/or  to bear some fixed amount of treatment costs via 
deductibles. Out-of-pocket payments by the privately insured with less than full 
cover account for a sizeable proportion of total out-of-pocket payments, with the 
rest being accounted for by copayments associated with sickness fund or AWBZ 
cover. 
4. Data, variable definitions and computational methods 
Our empirical analysis is based on data taken from the 1987 Household 
Expenditure Survey undertaken by the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). 
~1 In the Netherlands there are, in addition, statutory health insurance schemes for civil servants of 
provinces and municipalities (the so-called IZA/IZR schemes). We have included these under the 
"sickness fund" umbrella here, partly on grounds of expedience (our survey data classifies the 
contributions a sickness fund contributions) and in part because such a practice makes sense, given 
that membership of the scheme is compulsory and that contributions are income-related, 
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This is the same survey used in Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (1992), van Doorslaer 
et al. (1993a) and Janssen et al. (1994). Our unit of analysis is the household. 
After deleting unusable cases, our sample comprised 2226 households. Our sample 
was weighted using the weights supplied by CBS. Income, x, is gross income, 
defined along the lines of the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) (cf., for example, 
Smeeding et al., 1990), but grossed up to include employer contributions to the 
AWBZ and sickness fund schemes. These contributions are, in effect, fringe 
benefits and our practice of including them in gross income, although not in line 
with LIS conventions, is in line with those of the OECD (cf., for example, OECD, 
1990). Household income has been equivalised using AJL's equivalence scale with 
both parameters set equal to 0.5 - a household's equivalence factor is thus equal 
to the square root of the sum of the number of adults and half the number of 
children. 
Payments have been computed from each of the four financing sources - these 
are the analogue of T(x )  in AJL's notation. Direct and indirect taxes have been 
allocated pro rata, there being no earmarking of specific taxes for health care 
finance in the Netherlands. Direct taxes have been proxied by personal income 
taxes (accounting in reality for 63% of direct taxes), obtained directly from the 
survey. Indirect taxes have been assumed to be borne by the consumer and have 
been estimated from consumption patterns. Our indirect tax variable excludes 
indirect taxes other than VAT and excise duties, but accounts for 74% of all 
indirect taxes. AWBZ contributions have been assumed to be borne by the 
employee in the case of employees and have been obtained from the survey. Both 
employee and employer sickness fund contributions have been assumed to be 
borne by the employee and have been computed using the employee's contribution 
recorded in the survey. Private insurance premiums are recorded in the survey, as 
are out-of-pocket payments. The latter are for a 12-month period and include all 
outlays above a minium of Dfl 25. Included sources account for 93% of total 
health care revenues, the shortfall from 100% being attributable to the aforemen- 
tioned omitted irect and indirect axes. All payments have been equivalised using 
AJL's equivalence scale. 
Computation of the components of RE is not straightforward. The most 
cumbersome term to compute is H, since it involves computing as many Gini 
coefficients as there are groups of pre-payment equals. We have therefore com- 
puted this as a residual. RE can be computed simply as the difference between G x 
and Gx_  r - cf. Eq. (1). We have used the "convenient covariance" method 
adapted for a weighted sample (cf. Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1989). To compute V 
and R one has to decide on the ranges into which pre-payment incomes are to be 
grouped - i.e., which households are to be treated as pre-payment equals. We 
have picked a range of Dfl 894 per  annum - similar to the £3.82 per week figure 
used by AJL for 1986/87. R can then be computed as the difference between 
G x_ r and C x_  ~. K T is computed as the difference between the equal-treatment 
tax concentration i dex, calculated on grouped observations using the pre-payment 
groups based on the Dfl 894 range, and G x. 
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5. Principal empirical results 
Table 1 shows the distribution of the principal financing sources across 
equivalent income deciles, along with the corresponding values of g, K r, RE, V, 
H and R. Figures for the total health care financing burden are also reported. The 
positive and negative values of K r for direct and indirect taxes respectively 
indicate that direct taxes are progressive whilst indirect taxes are regressive. 
Sickness fund contributions are also regressive, not least because the majority of 
persons who are contracted out of the scheme (and are instead privately insured) 
are members of households with relatively high equivalent incomes. AWBZ 
contributions, by contrast, are marginally progressive - the reasons for this will 
become clear in Section 6. Private insurance premiums are also progressive, for 
the same reason that sickness fund contributions are regressive. The regressiveness 
of out-of-pocket payments reflects in part the fact that not all out-of-pocket 
payments are made by the privately insured but also the fact that there are some 
households with relatively low equivalent incomes which contain one or more 
persons who are privately insured. The Dutch health care financing system overall 
is somewhat regressive. 
The broad conclusions reached in the previous paragraph are much the same as 
those reached by van Doorslaer et al. (1993a). In contrast o that paper, the present 
paper also sheds light on the impact of the various health care financing sources 
on the distribution of income. As Eq. (4) makes clear, it is not just K T (i.e., 
departure from proportionality) that determines the vertical component of income 
redistribution but also g. For a given value of K r, the absolute value of V (i.e., 
the extent of income redistribution that would have occurred in the absence of any 
differential treatment) is higher, the higher is g. Likewise, a given value of V 
could be achieved by a variety of different combinations of K r and g. For 
example, the same value of V is recorded for both the AWBZ scheme and the 
private insurance scheme. In the case of the AWBZ scheme this is not so much 
due to a high degree of progressivity but rather due to the relative importance of 
the AWBZ scheme in the financing mix. By contrast, in the case of private 
insurance, the value of V is attributable more to a relatively high degree of 
progressivity than to a high relative share in the financing burden. The message 
here is clear: for a given degree of differential treatment, one needs to know g as 
well as K T in order to determine the impact of a financing source on the 
distribution of income. 
Turning to the question of differential treatment, it is clear that this too has an 
important influence on the income redistribution associated with health care 
finance in the Netherlands. Considering once again the AWBZ and private 
insurance schemes, it is evident hat although both record the same value of V, 
there is in practice more redistributive ffect associated with the AWBZ scheme 
than with the private insurance scheme. H and R in the case of the AWBZ 
scheme are relatively small and reduce redistributive ffect (compared to what it 
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Table 2 
Percentage decomposition of redistributive impact of Dutch health care financing system, 1987 
Index Direct Indirect Sickness AWBZ Private Direct Total 
taxes taxes funds insurance payments 
RE 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
V 100.2% 99.7% 90.4% 112.4% 191.8% 61.7% 86.3% 
H 0.1% -0 .2% -2 .3% 6.5% 27.5% -11.3% -3 .0% 
R 0.1% -0 .1% -7 .3% 5.9% 64.3% -27.0% - 10.6% 
would have been in the absence of differential treatment) only by a relatively 
small amount (0.00014). In the case of private insurance, by contrast, the values of 
H and R are fairly high, the implication being that differential treatment reduces 
redistributive ffect by rather more (0.00024). H and R are even higher in the 
case of sickness funds, their sum being equal to 0.00123. Since this a regressive 
financing source, differential treatment here increases redistributive ffect, RE 
being larger in absolute size than V. 
Another way of presenting the results for H and R is to express them as 
percentages of RE (see Table 2). The value of V for direct taxes of 100.2% 
indicates that direct taxes would have been 0.2% more redistributive if there had 
been no differential treatment, he values of H and R indicating that half of this 
shortfall is due to pure horizontal inequity and half to reranking. Indirect axes, by 
contrast, would have been marginally less redistributive in the absence of differen- 
tial treatment - here the regressiveness of the source causes RE to be negative and 
hence H and R are negative when expressed as percentages of RE. 12 Sickness 
funds would have been 9.6% less redistributive in the absence of differential 
treatment, he majority (7.3 percentage points) being due to reranking. A much 
higher degree of differential treatment occurs in private insurance - this source 
would have been 92% more redistributive in the absence of inter-household 
differences at a given level of equivalent income. Out-of-pocket payments also 
reflect a fairly high degree of differential treatment, and again the effect of 
inter-household differences is to increase the degree of redistributive ffect. 
Classical horizontal inequity accounts for some of this redistributive effect. Some 
of this is due to households with similar incomes having different insurance status 
- i.e., some will be insured with sickness funds, whilst others will be privately 
J2 The low percentages involved seem to reflect in part the low shares of direct and indirect axes in 
the overall financing burden - an increased emphasis on, say, direct taxes would raise g, leave K T 
unchanged and reduce the post-tax Gini coefficient. 
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insured - and therefore having different deductible arrangements. Some, though, 
is undoubtedly due to households with similar insurance status making different 
choices with respect either to the combination of premium and deductible or to the 
package of care itself. Overall, the pro-rich income redistribution associated with 
the Dutch health care financing system would have been around 14% less in the 
absence of differential treatment, with the bulk of this (11 percentage points) being 
attributable to reranking. 
This raises the question of the normative significance of H and R. In the case 
of the AWBZ scheme, as we shall see in more detail in the next section, the 
non-zero values of H and R are to a large extent attributable to the institutional 
features of the scheme that result in households on similar equivalent incomes 
making different (equivalent) contributions. Calling this "differential treatment" 
seems sensible, though whether one wants to refer to this differential treatment as 
inequitable is less clear, since one needs to know precisely what features of the 
scheme are responsible and whether they might be construed as generating 
equitable differential treatment. We return to this issue in the next section. Suffice 
to say for the moment hat the label "differential treatment" seems applicable. 
This label is also applicable in the case of direct taxes and other compulsory 
schemes, in this case the sickness funds being the obvious example. The applica- 
bility of the label is less clear where there is a degree of choice involved. Non-zero 
values of H and R in the case of indirect axes, for example, arise not because of 
differential treatment across households, but rather because household spending 
patterns differ. To some extent the same is true of out-of-pocket payments, but 
here there is much less "choice" involved - direct payments are made by 
individuals who are in poor health and it is not just choices that determine which 
individuals, at a given income level, are in poor health at any one time, but also 
chance. Given this, the non-zero values of H and R in the case of out-of-pocket 
payments do in a sense result from differential treatment across households, the 
source of differential treatment being the degree of ill-health of the household 
members. Some might also want to term such differential treatment "inequitable". 
Another issue is whether H has a different normative significance from R. 
Here, it seems important to be able to ascertain how much of any reranking is due 
to the existence of differential treatment and how much is due to marginal tax 
rates in excess of 100%. One may well want to bring the former under the 
horizontal equity umbrella, since even though it is the principle of vertical equity 
that such reranking offends, it is nonetheless a consequence of a horizontally 
inequitable tax system. If, as in Fig. 1, all reranking is caused by differential 
treatment, knowing the relative values of H and R (rather than just their sum) 
may not be particularly informative t¥om a policy perspective. This is reinforced 
by the fact that the relative values of H and R are sensitive to the choice of 
interval tk)r defining equals - AJL find, and results that we have obtained for the 
Dutch health care financing system confirm this, that H falls and R rises as the 
interval is reduced. 
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6. Some microsimulation detective work 
In this section we present the results of some detective work aimed at 
uncovering the sources of progressivity and differential treatment associated with 
the AWBZ scheme. Knowing these seems important from a policy perspective - 
for example, some sources of differential treatment may well be considered to be 
equitable by policy-makers. 
As indicated above, the contribution rules for the AWBZ scheme are straight- 
forward. Rules apply to indiv iduals rather than to households. Some individuals - 
notably pensioners - were exempt in 1987. Wage-earners pay a fixed percentage 
(4.55%) of their assessable income up to a ceiling of Dr  64550 (the maximum 
contribution therefore being Dfl 2937). Both the exemptions and the ceiling can be 
expected to have effects on V, H and R. The effect of the ceiling on V is, of 
course, to introduce a regressive lement into the AWBZ scheme. But the ceiling 
could also have effects on H and R, since the rules relate to individuals and we 
are using the household as the unit of analysis. For example, a household 
containing one earner with an income of Dr  100000 would pay Dr  2937 in 
contributions, whilst another household with the same income divided equally 
across two earners would pay Dr  4550. Reranking could also result. Suppose the 
one-earner household's income were Dfl I01 000 and the two-earner household's 
income were Dr  102000. The income of the first after AWBZ contributions 
would be Dr  98 063, whilst that of the richer household would be only Dr  97410. 
The exemptions will raise the value of V if those who are exempt are concentrated 
amongst the lower income deciles - as, in fact, they are. The exemptions can also 
obviously have effects on H and R. 
To ascertain the contributions of the exemptions and the ceiling to V, H and R, 
we have simulated the effects of three policies: (i) the abolition of the contribu- 
tions ceiling, (ii) the abolition of exemptions, and (iii) the abolition of both. In 
each case we have adjusted the contribution rate so as to generate the same 
(unequivalized) AWBZ revenues in each policy scenario, is The results are shown 
in Table 3. 
The effect of abolishing the ceiling is to make the AWBZ scheme a good deal 
more progressive (K r doubles) and hence to make the scheme marginally more 
pro-poor in its redistributive impact. The abolition of the ceiling also reduces the 
gap between actual and potential redistributive ffect from 12% to 5%, with H 
and R falling by the same amount (0.00001). Abolishing the exemptions (but 
keeping the ceiling intact) makes the AWBZ scheme become regressive and hence 
to result in pro-rich redistributive effect; the reason for this is the retention of the 
ceiling in this scenario. The effect on H of abolishing the exemptions is of the 
~3 The values of g in the three scenarios differ, since changing the rules also changes gross income, 
since this is defined as gross of the employer contribution. 
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Table 3 
The effects of exemptions and contribution ceiling on the redistributive impact of the AWBZ scheme, 
1987 
Index Actual AWBZ No ceiling No exemptions No ceiling or exemptions 
g 0.0278 0.0276 0.0327 0.0322 
K T 0.04670 0.09300 - 0.09178 - 0.04710 
RE 0.00119 0.00251 -0 .00322 0.00167 
V 0.00133 0.00264 -0 .00310 0.00157 
H 0.00008 0.00007 0.00007 0.00006 
R 0.00007 0.00006 0.00005 0.00004 
RE 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
V 112.4% 105.0% 96.4% 94.1% 
H 8.5% 2.7% - 2. t % -- 3.7% 
R 5.9% 2.3% - 1.5% 2.2% 
same order of magnitude as in the case where the ceiling is eliminated, but the 
effect on R in this case is somewhat larger. Eliminating the ceiling and the 
exemptions (scenario (iii)) still leaves a pro-poor edistributive effect and gives the 
smallest values of H and R of the three scenarios - H and R fall to 75% and 
57% of their pre-simulation values respectively. The fact that neither is reduced to 
zero reflects presumably the lack of consonance between the equivalence scale 
used and the rules of the AWBZ system. 
The fact that the exemptions appear to have a slightly greater effect on 
horizontal equity and reranking raises the obvious policy question: are these 
effects inequitable? An analysis such as this obviously cannot answer such a 
question. It does, however, help the policy-maker determine the direction in which 
he or she might wish to alter the rules concerning health care financing arrange- 
ments. 14 
7. Conclusions 
If ultimately a concern over the distribution of health care payments by income 
stems, at least in part, from a concern over the impact of health care payments on 
the income distribution, it seems important to extend the distributional analysis of 
health care payments beyond the analysis of progressivity to embrace the full 
range of determinants of redistributive effect. These include not just progressivity 
(or departure-from-proportionality), but also the share of income going to finance 
14 It is interesting to note that the exemptions were in fact abolished in 1990, accompanied by 
appropriate adjustments to pensions. 
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health care, the degree of pure horizontal inequity in the system (equals being 
treated unequally) and the extent of any reranking in the move from the pre-pay- 
ment to post-payment i come distribution. 
Our results suggest hat the Dutch health care financing system overall has 
pro-rich redistributive effect. Most of this is due to the system's regressiveness, 
which in turn is attributable to the duality of the system's insurance payments, 
with income-related payments mainly for the lower half of the income distribution 
and non-income-related premiums for the higher income groups. Some of the 
system's pro-rich redistributive effect is due, however, to horizontal inequity and 
reranking - redistributive effect would have been some 14% lower than it was in 
1987 if all households ateach level of (equivalent) income had made exactly the 
same (equivalent) health care payments. Of course, such inter-household differen- 
tial treatment may not always be considered to be (horizontally) inequitable - 
some of the "differential treatment", for example, arises through households 
having different spending patterns and hence paying different amounts of indirect 
tax. Ultimately it is up to policy-makers todecide whether horizontal inter-house- 
hold differences in payments are inequitable or not - the AJL decomposition 
simply indicates the importance of such differences in promoting or offsetting the 
redistributive effect generated by vertical inter-household differences. A microsim- 
ulation detective xercise of the type reported in this paper ought to help 
policy-makers pinpoint he sources of both vertical and horizontal inter-household 
differences. 
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